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 Arbitrary Detention: Whither — or 
Wither? — Section 9 
Steve Coughlan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a remarkable fact that more than 25 years after the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 came into effect, we still have no section 
9 jurisprudence. It is not that there have been no decisions at all concerning 
the right not to be arbitrarily detained, of course, but taken in total they 
do not come anywhere near setting out an analytical framework. This 
stands in contrast to most other legal rights in the Charter. Section 7 
jurisprudence has established the two-step approach to take in assessing 
claims under that section, including a three-step test for determining 
whether a proposed rule is a principle of fundamental justice.2
 
For section 
8 claims, very extensive case law has established that the right applies only 
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and that warrantless 
searches are prima facie unreasonable, and, most importantly, R. v. Collins 
has established a three-step test — (1) is the search authorized by law? 
(2) is the law itself reasonable? and (3) is the search carried out in a 
reasonable manner? — to assess any new situation involving a search.3 
Similar observations can be made around the development of informational 
and implementational rights relevant to section 10(b) or to the four-part 
analysis of whether there has been a violation of the right to a trial within 
a reasonable time in section 11(b). 
In the case of section 9, on the other hand, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has said little, and much of what it has said seems likely to be 
wrong. Individual fact situations have been found to result (or not) in 
arbitrary detentions, but no consistent framework for analyzing such claims 
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 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74 
(S.C.C.). 
3
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
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has been articulated or even consistently applied without being articulated. 
It must surely be surprising that a quarter-century of case law on the 
right to be free from arbitrary detention has not yet resulted in a clear 
definition of either the word “arbitrary” or the word “detention”. Indeed, 
among the relatively few cases which have been decided, probably the 
most significant results have been to recognize the existence of new 
police powers: that is, the primary effect of section 9 case law has been 
to limit personal rights rather than to protect them. 
Several reasons might have led to this relative neglect. First, an alleged 
violation of section 9 is unlikely to arise in isolation. If the detention is 
an on-the-street encounter, such as a vehicle stop or questioning of a 
pedestrian, then sections 8 and 10(b) are likely to be relevant. If the person 
was detained, then he or she will have been entitled to the right to counsel 
and might not have been afforded that. If the person has been charged 
with an offence, in all likelihood he or she was searched without a warrant 
as well as detained, and so a potential section 8 claim arises. In essence, 
if the accused has said something then section 10(b) is the sensible Charter 
right to assert, and if something was found on the accused, section 8 is 
the best claim. If the person said nothing and nothing was found then it 
is unlikely the person is an “accused” at all, and so the potential arbitrary 
detention all by itself is unlikely to be litigated. There could in principle 
be cases where only a section 9 violation is at issue, but they will be 
rare. More probable is that a section 9 violation might be asserted as part 
of a pattern of violations, but precisely because sections 8 and 10(b) already 
have well-developed analytical frameworks, the section 9 discussion is 
likely to be largely an afterthought. 
In the above cases, any Charter violation would lead to a possible 
section 24 remedy. Section 9 claims can also arise in contexts leading to 
a possible section 52 remedy: where statutory schemes such as dangerous 
offender legislation or security certificates are challenged.4
 
In those 
contexts, however, there is also likely to be an objection based on section 7 
or perhaps on section 12, cruel and unusual punishment. Again, the need 
to rely on section 9 is diminished. Although it did not have to be the right 
which was neglected, once analytical frameworks began to exist for other 
rights but not for section 9, the tendency to leave arbitrary detention 
undeveloped became self-reinforcing. 
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 See, for example, R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.); R. v. Swain, 
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Also probably relevant to the development of this pattern is that 
early case law seemed to make it extraordinarily easy to justify violations 
of section 9. As the dissent point out in R. v. Ladouceur, the third of the 
trilogy of vehicle stop cases, the roving random stop power which was 
found to be saved in that case permitted any police officer to “stop any 
vehicle at any time, in any place, without having any reason to do so” 
which was “a total negation of the freedom from arbitrary detention  
guaranteed by section 9 of the Charter”.5 If such a violation of section 9 
could be saved under section 1, it is not surprising that defence counsel 
might decide it was not ultimately fruitful to worry too much about 
proving a prima facie arbitrary detention. 
In discussing the lack of section 9 jurisprudence I will consider three 
issues: (1) whether “arbitrary” has or should be equated with “unlawful”; 
(2) what “arbitrary” means and; (3) what “detention” means. I shall proceed 
in two stages: by considering the first 25 years of case law, and then the 
start of the second 25 years — or, more simply, everything up to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Clayton6 and then Clayton itself. In 
essence, my intent is to show that both prior to and after Clayton, the 
Court has not created a section 9 jurisprudence. Important questions were 
left essentially unaddressed until this most recent decision, so that no 
general analytical approach to section 9 existed. Further, although Clayton 
addresses some of those questions, it does so in a way that still does not 
create anything which could be called a section 9 jurisprudence, and which 
in fact reflects a detrimental approach to analyzing the Charter in general. 
II. THE FIRST 25 YEARS 
1. Does “Unlawful” Equate to “Arbitrary”? 
This is a relatively simple point, and its equivalent has been established 
with regard to section 8 for about 20 years. Since R. v. Collins and R. v. 
Kokesch it has been clear that an illegal search is an unreasonable search.7 
Making this equation has had many benefits in terms of clarity, and has 
had the effect of making “search and seizure law” and “section 8 law” 
essentially the same thing. In that particular context, the rule is captured 
                                                                                                            
5
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1264 (S.C.C.). 
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 [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). 
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by the first two parts of the test set out in Collins for analyzing whether 
there is a section 8 violation: whether the search is authorized by law, 
and whether the law itself is reasonable. 
In the context of section 9, the equivalent point would be that an 
unlawful detention is an arbitrary detention. In the first 25 years, the 
Court left this point unsettled: one could not say that the statement was 
true, but equally one could not say it was not true. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal, for example, had rejected the equation in its decision in R. v. 
Duguay, holding that a police officer who arrested on grounds that fell just 
short of being reasonable would have acted unlawfully but not arbitrarily.8
 
On appeal, however, the only issue was whether the evidence should be 
excluded, and so the Supreme Court was not required to — and did not 
— comment on this point. Similarly, on other occasions the Court has 
deliberately left the issue aside, as in, for example, R. v. Latimer: 
“[u]nlawful arrests may be inherently arbitrary ... [but] it is not necessary 
to address that question.”9 
The potential equation of “unlawful” and “arbitrary” would actually 
break down to three related rules. Two of the rules are clear: if a detention 
is lawful it is not arbitrary, and if a detention is not lawful it is arbitrary. 
However, the first rule should also raise a third rule, similar to the second 
part of the R. v. Collins10 test for searches: if the detention is lawful, the 
law authorizing the detention is itself reasonable. 
Of these three rules, the first — if a detention is lawful it is not 
arbitrary — has actually been laid down by the Court. It held recently in 
R. v. Mann that “[i]t is well recognized that a lawful detention is not 
‘arbitrary’,” 11 and that is in accord with the result in a long line of cases. 
What has not been so clearly established is whether there is a need to 
ask the follow-up question, “is the law itself reasonable?” This is an 
area in which the lack of a section 9 analytical framework is apparent. 
The Court has failed to specifically state whether this is or is not a rule, 
and its practice in this regard has made it difficult to glean a rule by 
implication. 
In some cases, the Court has necessarily been asking whether the 
law itself is reasonable, since a statutory scheme permitting detention was 
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 [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.). 
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at issue. In deciding that the provisions in the Criminal Code12 requiring 
the automatic detention of anyone found not guilty by reason of insanity 
violated section 9, for example, the very issue was the reasonableness of 
the law.13 Further, in many of the vehicle stop cases, effectively the 
equivalent of asking “is the law itself reasonable?” results from the 
Court’s approach in those decisions: find the detention arbitrary but 
uphold the law authorizing it under section 1. This approach, adopted 
for example in R. v. Hufsky, R. v. Ladouceur and R. v. Wilson, amounts 
to saying that the detention was authorized by law and that the law itself 
was reasonable.14
 
In other cases the Court has explicitly referred to the 
issue as though it were a necessary step: in R. v. Latimer, for example, 
the Court concluded that the arrest was lawful and therefore “failing an 
attack against the legislative provision which authorized the arrest”, 
there could not be a section 9 violation.15 It is therefore apparent that the 
question must sometimes be asked. 
On the other hand, in other cases the Court’s treatment of the question 
is less clear. In R. v. Jacques,16 for example, the Court concluded that the 
Customs Act17 permitted a customs officer to stop and search a vehicle 
on the relatively low standard that the officer suspects the possibility of 
smuggling. The majority and dissent disagreed over whether the evidence 
permitted that suspicion reasonably to be formed, the majority concluding 
that it did. The majority also explains why the border crossing context 
meant that this lower standard was “eminently understandable”.18 However, 
it is not entirely clear in context whether this discussion is meant to be a 
rejection of a section 9 challenge to the legislative provision, an argument 
that the section 9 violation is justified under section 1, an interpretive tool to 
understanding the wording of the Customs Act, or something else. 
Further, some cases seem to ignore the question. In R. v. Mann, for 
example, the Court creates a common law power of investigative detention 
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 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 542 (2). 
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 R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.). 
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 [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 26 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Dedman, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.), where the Court concluded that a vehicle stop was 
not authorized by s. 14 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 202, and therefore that 
“it is unnecessary to express an opinion as to the constitutional validity of s. 14” (at para. 63). 
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 [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.). 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.). 
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 R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
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and accordingly concludes that the accused was not unlawfully detained: 
it moves from that immediately to the conclusion that he was not arbitrarily 
detained.19 To do so is to ignore any requirement that the law itself must 
be reasonable. Of course one might suggest that in Mann, or any other 
case involving the use of the ancillary powers doctrine, the step is 
unnecessary because the court would not create a common law power 
and then find it to be unreasonable. In fact, though, the Court does not 
omit this step when engaged in this same process in other contexts. 
In R. v. Mann,20 for example, the Court used the ancillary powers 
doctrine first to create the investigative detention power and second to 
create a power of search incident to that investigative detention. In the 
search context the Court observed: 
 A finding that a limited power of protective search exists at common 
law does not obviate the need to apply the Collins test for determining 
whether a warrantless search passes constitutional muster under section 8 
of the Charter.21 
That is, even though the Court had just created a new common law 
power, it still noted the separate requirement that that law was required 
to be reasonable. 
Certainly a specific requirement that any law authorizing a detention 
must itself be reasonable seems like a minimum requirement for a sensible 
section 9 analytical framework. The Court has tended to operate on the 
assumption that there is such a rule, but it would be beneficial to have 
that requirement unambiguously stated. 
The more difficult half of equating “unlawful” with “arbitrary” is the 
final issue: whether, if a detention is not lawful, that automatically means 
it is arbitrary. This equation has been made in the case of searches, but 
was not, in the first 25 years, settled in the case of detentions. 
As noted above, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Duguay22 rejected 
this position, on the basis that an arrest which fell just short of reasonable 
grounds should not be seen as arbitrary. That particular argument has 
probably been overtaken by subsequent events. When the Ontario Court 
of Appeal took that position, one could have said with some confidence 
that short of the existence of reasonable and probable grounds, the police 
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 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). The same approach is taken in R. v. Dedman, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
20
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). 
21
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, at para. 44 (S.C.C.). See also para. 36. 
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 [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.). 
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had no authority to detain an individual. Since R. v. Mann,23 of course, it 
is clear that this position is no longer correct: police can also briefly 
detain an individual where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that 
there is a clear nexus between that individual and a recent or ongoing 
criminal offence, and the detention is reasonable in all the circumstances. 
As a result, it is no longer clear that a detention on something “just short” 
of reasonable grounds would be unlawful at all: it might well qualify as an 
investigative detention and thus still be lawful.24 
However, the issue of unlawful detentions is broader than failed arrests: 
there are many circumstances in which the state could fail to comply 
with the requirements of the law and as a result detain an accused. For 
example, section 503 of the Criminal Code25 requires an arrested person 
to be taken before a justice of the peace as soon as practicable, and in 
any case within 24 hours: failure to comply with that requirement will 
result in an unlawful detention. Lower courts are divided as to whether 
such a detention will be arbitrary. This particular issue has actually 
come before the Supreme Court of Canada, but its entire decision — 
overturning a court of appeal judgment — consisted of two sentences 
stating that there was no reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion 
by the trial judge.26 On no other occasion in the first 25 years did the Court 
clarify this issue, and so whether unlawfulness necessarily amounted to 
arbitrariness was left in doubt. 
There are good reasons to adopt such a rule: simplicity and clarity 
are among them. If arbitrariness can be inferred from unlawfulness, that 
does not end the analysis: further steps follow which allow for balancing 
the competing interests. On the other hand, if unlawfulness need not 
mean arbitrariness, then before reaching those other steps additional 
analytical tools will need to be developed. If it is not just unlawfulness 
that makes a detention arbitrary, then what further criteria must be met 
as well? Since these considerations, whatever they might be, can be built 
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 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). 
24
 See, for example, R. v. Pimentel, [2000] M.J. No. 256, 2000 MBCA 35 (Man. C.A.), 
where the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that an officer who had arrested an accused did not 
have grounds to do so, but did have articulable cause and therefore had the authority on that basis to 
detain the person. Pimentel predates R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) and so 
does not apply the investigative detention test arising from it. Although this means a different result 
might be reached on the particular facts, it does illustrate that such an approach is possible. 
25
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
26
 See R. v. Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 29 C.R. (4th) 274, at para. 98 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 12, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 449 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. W. (E.), [2002] N.J. No. 226, 168 C.C.C. 
(3d) 38 (Nfld. C.A.), or R. v. Tam, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1428, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196 (B.C.C.A.). 
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into other aspects of the analysis, it is unnecessarily complex to introduce 
an extra step at this preliminary stage. 
More important than clarity and simplicity, however, would be the 
fact that equating unlawfulness with arbitrariness would better reflect the 
way that the state’s coercive powers are meant to interact with individual 
liberty. The point has been stated by the Court many times, but was put 
most succinctly in R. v. Mann: 
Absent a law to the contrary, individuals are free to do as they please. 
By contrast, the police (and more broadly, the state) may act only to 
the extent that they are empowered to do so by law.27 
That is, individuals should be free from coercive intervention unless 
some specific power authorizes the police or other state actors to so 
intervene. This is a fundamental proposition not just about criminal 
investigative powers, but about the nature of liberal democracy. Equating 
unlawfulness with arbitrariness accords with this position: failing to make 
the equation is inconsistent with it. 
If the unlawfulness of a detention — that is, the fact that the police 
were not empowered by law to make the detention — meant that it was 
arbitrary, then an individual might be able to obtain a Charter remedy. 
This result would not be guaranteed, since there will be further hurdles 
to cross, but this approach would provide some positive support for the 
assertion that individuals are free to do as they please. On the other hand, 
if unlawfulness did not amount to arbitrariness, then in some cases there 
would be no violation of section 9 despite the fact that the police had 
acted without authority. This would amount to saying that individuals 
are not always free to do as they please even though there is no law to 
the contrary. It would also amount to saying that police may sometimes 
act even though they are not empowered to do so by law. In other words, 
denying the equation contradicts both components of this fundamental 
democratic proposition. 
It is also worth elaborating on the further steps involved in the Charter 
analysis: at least three “safety valves” exist to help guard against anything 
seeming like an unmeritorious claim. In particular, for an accused to receive 
any real benefit from a section 9 Charter argument, the police action 
must not only have been arbitrary but also must have amounted to a 
detention, that arbitrary detention must not be saved under section 1, 
and a remedy (most likely under section 24) must be appropriate. At each 
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 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
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of these stages the claim could fail, and so equating “unlawful” with 
“arbitrary” is not the end of the story. 
That said, it must be acknowledged that there are some limits on 
how effective those safety valves could actually be. Realistically, it is 
likely that in many cases where a section 9 claim is pursued, the 
“detention” aspect of the analysis will be met. At least in cases where 
police have purported to use a power but have fallen outside the conditions 
for using it — the type of “failed arrest” cases falling just short of 
reasonable grounds referred to in R. v. Duguay,28 or overly long periods 
before an arrested person is taken before a justice of the peace in 
accordance with section 503 of the Criminal Code29
 — the nature of the 
interference with liberty is likely to meet any reasonable definition of 
“detention”. The point of such police powers, after all, is precisely to 
authorize police to assert control over an individual’s liberty. If police 
have attempted to use such a power without meeting the conditions for 
doing so, there is not likely to be much doubt that the individual was 
detained. 
On the other hand, if the unlawfulness arises from the fact that police 
are simply acting in a way which is unregulated — by asking questions 
of an individual on the street without asserting control over that person’s 
movements, for example — then there could be some dispute over whether 
there was a detention at all. When the unlawfulness arises from a complete 
absence of any power rather than a failed exercise of a power, what is most 
likely to be at issue is a psychological detention, which will be discussed in 
greater detail below. For the moment it is only necessary to observe that 
psychological detentions are the most difficult to identify, and so in this 
context at least the need to meet this further criterion could plausibly 
lead to a finding that there is no prima facie section 9 violation. 
It should also be noted that adopting the relatively broad approach 
of saying that unlawfulness equates to unreasonableness could cause 
more narrow approaches to be used elsewhere, such as in defining 
“detention”. In the search context, for example, the Court has not only 
said that an illegal search is an unreasonable one, it has also held that a 
warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable. As a practical matter, 
though, warrantless searches not authorized by any law do sometimes 
produce evidence of crime, and it is only those instances that actually 
come to court. As a result, judges tend only to see the factually guilty, 
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 [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.). 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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but are faced with rules saying that the warrantless action was illegal and 
therefore unreasonable. In response, there has been a tendency in recent 
years to reconsider and narrow the meaning of the word “search”, and to 
restrict the impact of section 8 in that fashion.30 It would be unfortunate 
if the effect of making clearer the meaning of “arbitrarily” in section 9 
were simultaneously to make less clear the meaning of “detained”. 
The second safety valve, the use of section 1, is also likely to have a 
limited role in practice. If there is a prima facie section 9 violation, then 
in principle that infringement of rights could be justified under section 1. 
However, a requirement of saving a violation under section 1 is that it 
was “prescribed by law”: by definition we would be discussing violations 
not prescribed by law, since the arbitrariness arises from unlawfulness. 
Admittedly the Court has been responsible for some fancy manoeuvring 
around the “prescribed by law” issue, such as by finding a law in the 
“operational requirements” of a statute in R. v. Orbanski.31 Still, to do 
anything of that sort in this context would be to find that the infringement 
was not unlawful after all, so it would remove it from the set of cases 
under discussion. 
On the other hand, section 24 can function perfectly well as a safety 
valve. Courts routinely find violations of section 8 or section 10(b) but 
decide that the evidence garnered should nonetheless be admitted. Under 
section 24(1), only an “appropriate and just” remedy is to be granted. If 
the unlawfulness in question is so minor as to amount to a technicality, 
then despite the finding of a section 9 violation it could be that granting 
no remedy is just in the circumstances. 
Of course, the remedy section must truly be used as a safety valve: 
that is, with regard to the particular circumstances of a particular case. It 
ought not to be used on a “blanket” basis to ignore particular classes of 
section 9 violations. If courts were to reason, for example, that no remedy 
was appropriate on any occasion when police detained a person only briefly 
for an investigative detention without meeting the R. v. Mann32
 
criteria, 
this would actually amount to creating a new police power. Since there 
would be no consequence to the finding of a section 9 violation, and indeed 
there would be tacit approval of the behaviour, courts would effectively 
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 See R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.) or R. v. Tessling, 
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 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
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 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). 
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be giving a green light to police to act as though they had such a power. 
That is not the role of section 24. 
This point does raise, however, an important fourth safety valve 
which makes it appropriate to equate “unlawful” with “arbitrary”. It is 
not the task of section 9, nor of courts in interpreting section 9, to see to 
it that all necessary police powers exist. Of course society is safer when 
genuinely necessary police powers exist, but nonetheless creating those 
powers is not the role of section 9 of the Charter. 
Rather, the role of section 9, like that of the rest of the Charter, is to 
protect against state power, and police power in particular. If police act 
where they have no power to do so, the Charter should protect individuals 
by recognizing that police did not have the authority to act, which is what 
equating “unlawful” and “arbitrary” would do. If more police powers 
should exist, then it is open to Parliament to change the Criminal Code33 or 
some other statute. That is precisely the purpose of the “prescribed by law” 
criterion in section 1: to recognize that Charter rights can be overridden 
for a sufficiently important competing objective, but only when legislators 
have determined to do so. Exactly the same reasoning applies in this 
context. If particular unlawful police action seems like it should not be 
found to violate section 9, then Parliament could authorize it. At that stage 
the quite fully developed analytical framework already built up around 
section 1 can be used to assess the competing interests. 
Failing to equate “unlawful” and “arbitrary”, however, makes it more 
difficult to follow this route. As a result, failing to make this equation is 
not just an instance of the lack of section 9 jurisprudence in itself: it also 
helps prevent using well-developed jurisprudence developed in other areas 
of the Charter. 
I suggest, therefore, that it would be entirely beneficial for section 9 
jurisprudence to include the rule that an unlawful detention is an arbitrary 
one. That is, however, the start of the analysis, not the end of it. To say 
that unlawful detentions are arbitrary is a useful part of the definition of 
“arbitrary”, but it is not the entire definition. We should therefore now 
turn to look at that question in greater detail. 
2. The Definition of “Arbitrary” 
This is an aspect of section 9 where the Court has actually articulated 
a rule. Unfortunately it seems pretty clear that the rule laid down cannot 
                                                                                                            
33
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
158 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
be correct and that something more, or perhaps something entirely different, 
is needed. 
The earliest cases dealing with section 9 were a series of vehicle stop 
cases. In R. v. Hufsky,34
 
the particular scheme in question was authorized 
by statute and allowed police to randomly stop vehicles to check for 
mechanical fitness and licensing issues. The stops were purely random, 
not requiring any criteria to be met: rather, the selection of vehicles was 
in the absolute discretion of the police officer. In this context the Court 
offered its definition of “arbitrary” for the purposes of section 9: “A 
discretion is arbitrary if there are no criteria, express or implied, which 
govern its exercise.”35 
This definition was consistently applied in a number of other vehicle 
stop cases.36 Importantly, it was also applied beyond vehicle stops to other 
contexts: to assess various aspects of the Criminal Code’s37 bail provisions, 
for example.38 Similarly, in considering the automatic detention of a person 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, without making specific reference 
to R. v. Hufsky,39
 
the Court nonetheless adopted the same standard: 
“[t]he duty of the trial judge to detain is unqualified by any standards 
whatsoever. I cannot imagine a detention being ordered on a more 
arbitrary basis.”40 
In the context of vehicle stops, it might have been the case that “no 
criteria” was not meant to be a definition of “arbitrary”, but simply one 
fashion in which arbitrariness could be established. That is, it might 
have been the case that one could show a detention to be arbitrary by 
showing it to be governed by no criteria, but also in some other fashion 
as well. However, the way in which the test was used in other cases shows 
that “no criteria” is not merely a way to be arbitrary, it is the way to be 
arbitrary: that is, for the Supreme Court it is the definition of the term. 
In R. v. Lyons,41 for example, the dangerous offender provisions were 
challenged under sections 7, 9 and 12 of the Charter. The Court noted 
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that the provisions set out criteria governing when an offender could be 
designated as dangerous, and noted that: “If these criteria are themselves 
unconstitutional, it is because they otherwise fail adequately to safeguard 
the liberty of the individual, not because they are arbitrary.”42 That is,  
so long as there were criteria, the detention was not arbitrary. Any 
challenge to the content of the criteria, the Court held, would involve a 
challenge under section 12 (or presumably section 7). 
Similarly, in both R. v. Pearson43 and R. v. Morales44 the Court adopted 
“no criteria” as a definition for assessing aspects of the Code’s bail 
provisions. After citing the R. v. Hufsky45 definition of “arbitrary”, the 
Court concluded that the provisions were “not arbitrary in this sense”: 
that is, there were criteria. Insofar as the section 9 discussion was 
concerned, that settled the matter, with no discussion about the content 
of those criteria. In each case, that the provisions had some criteria — 
that they were not random — led directly to the conclusion that the 
provisions did not violate section 9. If the provisions were not arbitrary 
in “that sense”, then they were not arbitrary at all. Those two cases show 
that “no criteria” is not merely one way to be arbitrary, but is in fact the 
definition of “arbitrary”.46 
The trouble is that this definition is clearly inadequate if section 9 is 
to play anything like the kind of role one would expect it to play. To 
take the simplest example, if section 9 is to play any significant role at 
all, then one would expect it to be capable of addressing racial profiling. 
Indeed, racial profiling is one of the few situations where section 9 
would actually be useful in isolation. That is, a person might be stopped 
based on his or her race, but then be advised of the right to counsel and 
legally searched. In such circumstances there would be no section 8 or 
section 10(b) claims, but the impropriety of detaining the person based 
on race should give rise to a section 9 claim. 
However, to stop a person based on race is not to stop that person 
based on no criteria. Rather, it is to stop the person based on improper 
criteria. As the Court has developed the definition of “arbitrary” so far, 
the use of improper criteria is not a relevant consideration under section 9. 
                                                                                                            
42
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 347 (S.C.C.). 
43
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.). 
44
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). 
45
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.). 
46
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, at 700 (S.C.C.); [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 
3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). 
160 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The definition in R. v. Hufsky,47 consciously adopted in other cases and 
contexts, excludes consideration of that issue. 
That said, the Court has occasionally said things which show it 
recognizes that section 9 should address interests other than random 
detentions. It has not offered an alternative definition of “arbitrary”, but it 
has made statements inconsistent with randomness being the only relevant 
issue. 
In R. v. Lyons, for example, the Court suggested in the midst of its 
section 9 discussion of dangerous offender legislation that “if … a 
prosecutor in a particular case was motivated by improper or arbitrary 
reasons in making a Part XXI application, a section 24 remedy would lie” 
(emphasis added).48
 
Similarly, in the context of a section 9 challenge in R. v. Storrey, the 
Court suggested that an otherwise valid arrest could be invalidated if it 
was shown that “a police officer was biased towards a person of a different 
race, nationality or colour, or that there was a personal enmity between a 
police officer directed towards the person arrested”.49 These cases offer 
no new definition of arbitrariness, but do at least recognize that broader 
issues are involved. 
Quite recently, the Court has used a standard other than randomness 
in assessing a section 9 claim, though without noting that they were 
departing from R. v. Hufsky50
 
or offering any real rationale for the different 
standard. In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)51 the 
Court was faced with a section 9 challenge to the security certificate 
scheme under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act52 which 
permitted foreign nationals to be detained without warrant, and which 
prevented review of this detention for 120 days. The Court upheld the 
first of these rules but struck down the second. In upholding detention 
without a warrant under a security certificate, the Court held that a 
detention is not arbitrary when there are “standards that are rationally 
related to the purpose of the power of detention”.53 Unlike, for example, 
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R. v. Lyons,54 the Court did not focus on the mere existence of criteria  
at all, but rather on their content: that detention was ordered because the 
person posed a danger, and this was a rational foundation. This is a better 
approach than in Lyons. 
On the other hand, the Court struck down the 120-day period of 
non-review, holding that it violated section 9. Although it is clear that 
the Court did not use the “no criteria” definition to reach this conclusion, 
it is not clear what other definition was used. They noted that similar 
reviews of other detentions were required to occur in periods of 24 to 48 
hours, and seemingly concluded directly from this difference that the 
120-day detention violated section 9. 
Certainly an adequate section 9 jurisprudence requires more than a 
definition of arbitrary that is limited to “based on no criteria”. That  
standard, as noted above, fails to deal with the very serious issue of racial 
profiling. Beyond that, however, it fails to deal with many other types of 
situations for which section 9 seems to be designed. Applied literally it 
would have absurd results, since “foolish criteria” does not meet the “no 
criteria” standard. That would mean that a police officer stopping every 
car which passes would be causing arbitrary detentions, but an officer who 
stopped only yellow cars because he thought he had read somewhere that 
alcoholics favoured that colour would not be acting arbitrarily. The second 
officer would not be violating section 9, and so would not need his ability 
to act on this mistaken belief justified under section 1. It is difficult to 
imagine that that is the intent behind the prohibition on arbitrary detentions. 
Indeed, lower courts routinely find section 9 violations in circumstances 
not based on the “no criteria” definition. 
First, although police sometimes misuse their powers based on 
objectionable criteria like race or nationality, there is no particular reason 
that the concept of arbitrary detention should be limited to only those 
particular misuses. In R. v. Herter,55 for example, the accused was stopped 
on suspicion of impaired driving and was deliberately unresponsive to 
the officer’s questions. The officer conceded in cross-examination that 
he placed the accused in the drunk tank out of frustration, solely because he 
had been uncooperative. The accused was kept there for over seven hours, 
as a punishment for his behaviour. The judge concluded — rightly, one 
would think — that this amounted to a section 9 violation. On the 
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Supreme Court’s definition, the officer’s decision was not made randomly 
or without criteria, and so was not arbitrary. 
Beyond that, there are many instances of courts finding section 9 
violations where no issue of malice, race-based or otherwise, arises at 
all. Frequently a section 9 violation is found because police have failed 
to stay within the limits of their powers, though no question of random 
action arises. For example, courts recently found arbitrary detentions in all 
of the following situations, none of which involved randomness or malice: 
R. v. Perello: The police arrested the accused for a “proceeds of crime 
investigation” solely because $55,000 cash was found in his camper van. 
This was found not to constitute reasonable grounds for arrest. Although 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took the view that being unlawful 
did not automatically make the arrest arbitrary, it nonetheless found that 
there was a section 9 violation.56 
R. v. Calderon: The police detained the occupants of a vehicle for a 
purported investigative detention concerning drug trafficking based on 
“indicators” such as the presence of cell phones, fast food wrappers and 
maps in the car. Pointing out the “neutrality and apparent unreliability” 
of these features, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the police 
had in fact been acting on a hunch, not on a power of investigative 
detention, and therefore had arbitrarily detained the accused.57 
R. v. Houben: The police stopped a vehicle, but were not acting under 
the authority of a statutory stop check power which did exist. Rather, they 
stopped the car based on what they subjectively felt was a reasonable 
suspicion. Finding that objectively the suspicion was not reasonable, the 
court held that the accused’s section 9 right had been violated.58 
R. v. D. (J.): The police stopped the accused to question him while 
he was walking on the street, but there were no reasonable grounds to 
suspect that he was connected to a particular crime. As a result the 
investigative detention power in R. v. Mann59 was not available and the 
accused was arbitrarily detained.60 
R. v. K. (C.): The police arrested the two accused and did not take 
them before a justice of the peace within 24 hours. They could have done 
so during ordinary business hours but had not finished interrogating the 
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accused at that time. By the time the interrogation was over justices of 
the peace were not so easily available. Because the police chose not to 
respect the 24-hour deadline, there was a section 9 violation.61 
R. v. Jutras: The accused was a Canadian citizen stopped for impaired 
driving. Because he was registered as a student at a U.S. university, the 
police decided not to release him but instead to hold him overnight and 
take him to a bail hearing on the basis that he was a flight risk. Since there 
was no reasonable ground for this belief, his detention was arbitrary.62 
These examples could be multiplied many-fold. In practice, lower 
courts in Canada generally do not apply the only definition of “arbitrary” 
that the Supreme Court has handed down. This means that the actual test 
used for arbitrary detention is something other than what the Court has 
said. We clearly need a section 9 jurisprudence which includes a more 
accurate and useful definition of “arbitrarily”. 
I do not propose here to offer precise wording for a revised definition, 
but it is clear what sort of factors must be taken into account. First, I 
have suggested in the previous section that detentions should be seen  
as arbitrary if they are unlawful. Accordingly, “unlawful detentions are 
arbitrary” should be part of the definition. However, there is more to be 
said. 
As the examples from recent cases show, detentions should be seen 
as arbitrary in a number of situations. When police or other state officials 
deliberately misuse their powers or use them for oblique motives, any 
resulting detention should be seen as arbitrary. When police are motivated 
by unconscious factors to use their powers against one accused where 
they would not have done so against another (which would describe some 
cases of racial profiling, as well as other instances), such a detention 
should be arbitrary. Where police are overly casual in the use of their 
powers, choosing to arrest or detain without giving sufficient consideration 
to whether the preconditions for exercising a coercive power genuinely 
exist, that detention should be seen as arbitrary. When police are unwise 
in the use of their powers, subjectively concluding that reasonable grounds 
exist when objectively that is entirely unreasonable, the detention should 
be called arbitrary. All of these are approaches which offer a more complete 
and realistic meaning to the word “arbitrary”. 
It is worth considering how these examples interact with the suggested 
rule that unlawful detentions are arbitrary. On some of these examples, 
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one could say that the police had acted lawfully but that the detention was 
arbitrary nonetheless. Consider, for example, the roving random stop power 
approved in R. v. Ladouceur.63
 
Although police have the power to stop 
any vehicle at any time, the case acknowledges the possibility of racial 
profiling and states that it would violate the Charter.64 It would be odd to 
say that such a stop had become unlawful: it would have been made 
entirely in accord with the legal power granted. Rather, it would be more 
natural to say that despite being lawful the detention was nonetheless 
unreasonable. It would constitute an arbitrary detention on that basis. 
Similarly, in R. v. Storrey,65 where the Court held that bias or enmity 
could render invalid an otherwise lawful arrest, it seems unnecessary to 
think of the arrest as unlawful. If an officer has subjective grounds to 
arrest which are objectively reasonable, then the arrest is lawful; if the 
officer is also motivated by personal dislike for the arrestee without which 
he or she might have exercised the discretion differently, then the arrest 
seems like an arbitrary detention. The normal requirements for a legal 
arrest would still be met, however, so it would not necessarily be unlawful. 
Indeed, consider subsections 495(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code:66 
between them they state that although there are circumstances in which 
a peace officer should not arrest, an arrest will nonetheless be lawful.  
It is not odd to think that such an arrest might be arbitrary, however. It  
is as true for police as for anyone else that there are times when it is 
unreasonable to use the powers one has. Arbitrariness should not demand 
unlawfulness. 
There is a further point to be noted. The Court generally has acted on, 
without specifically articulating, an equivalent to the rule for searches that 
“the law itself is reasonable”, which is the second part of the R. v. Collins67 
analysis. It would also be beneficial to incorporate an equivalent to the 
third part of that analysis, that the search is carried out in a reasonable 
manner. Even when using existing search powers, police are required to 
use them reasonably: the same should be said for detentions. To avoid 
being arbitrary when a detention is authorized by law, the law itself 
must be reasonable and the power to detain must be used in a reasonable 
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manner. Adding this requirement would capture abuse of powers for 
deliberate or unconscious racial profiling, detentions motivated by enmity 
or annoyance, and even potentially foolish or unwise misuse of discretion 
around bail, such as in R. v. K. (C.)68 or R. v. Jutras,69 above. 
So although unlawful detentions should be arbitrary, so too should 
be some lawful detentions, when there is improper police action. That is 
not to say, though, that impropriety should be a requirement. It is clearer 
that a detention should be seen as arbitrary if, for example, police have 
not bothered to think about the limits of their power and therefore have 
acted outside them. However, to insist on such a criterion would complicate 
the review process. In deciding whether police had reasonable grounds 
for arrest, for example, it would make it necessary to do something like 
adopt two standards of review: if the grounds were not objectively 
reasonable, then the arrest would be unlawful, but they would need to be 
somehow even further removed from reasonable to also be arbitrary. 
Similar rules would need to be adopted for the wide variety of contexts 
in which detentions can occur. 
This approach would be needlessly complex. As discussed in the first 
section, it would be simpler, clearer, and more in accordance with the 
purpose of section 9 in particular and the Charter in general to incorporate 
into the definition of arbitrary the simple requirement that the detention 
be unlawful. Whether a police officer has acted despite the complete 
absence of any statutory or common law power to do so, or has attempted 
to use a particular power but not met the specific requirements for doing 
so, the resulting detention can reasonably be described as arbitrary. 
Whether the failure to comply with a statutory power is serious or minor 
could then properly be considered under section 24. 
3. The Definition of “Detention” 
The Court has articulated a reasonably clear definition of the term 
“detention”. That is the case, however, because many of the very earliest 
Charter decisions addressed the issue of what kind of police intervention 
would trigger the right to counsel in section 10(b).70 The Court subsequently 
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decided that the word “detention” has the same meaning in ss. 9 and 10, 
and so that section 10(b) jurisprudence can be carried over.71 
The Court initially considered the meaning of “detention” in R. v. 
Therens, where it noted that a broad definition was appropriate because of 
the existence of section 1: since limitations on the right could be justified 
elsewhere, there was no need to build limits into the definition.72 Shortly 
afterward the Court restated its conclusions from that case in R. v. Thomsen: 
1. In its use of the word “detention”, s. 10 of the Charter is directed to 
a restraint of liberty other than arrest in which a person may reasonably 
require the assistance of counsel but might be prevented or impeded from 
retaining and instructing counsel without delay but for the constitutional 
guarantee. 
2. In addition to the case of deprivation of liberty by physical constraint, 
there is a detention within s. 10 of the Charter, when a police officer 
or other agent of the state assumes control over the movement of a 
person by a demand or direction which may have significant legal 
consequence and which prevents or impedes access to counsel. 
3. The necessary element of compulsion or coercion to constitute a 
detention may arise from criminal liability for refusal to comply with a 
demand or direction, or from a reasonable belief that one does not 
have a choice as to whether or not to comply. 
4. Section 10 of the Charter applies to a great variety of detentions of 
varying duration and is not confined to those of such duration as to 
make the effective use of habeas corpus possible.73 
Generally speaking these definitions, recognizing as they do that there 
are different ways in which a person could be detained, have proven 
quite serviceable. The one aspect, however, which has proven less 
straightforward and has given rise to real difficulty in practice is the 
concept, first introduced in R. v. Therens,74 of “psychological detention”. 
This is contained in the third part of the definition from R. v. Thomsen,75 
“a reasonable belief that one does not have a choice as to whether or not 
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to comply”. In practice this has been a difficult test to apply, and there 
would be much benefit to a more complete discussion and definition. 
Unfortunately, the Court has passed up several opportunities to provide 
that clarification. 
Psychological detention raises complications because almost by 
definition it involves situations in which police have acted where they in 
fact had no power to act. Most typically the issue arises in police 
questioning situations. For example, the police might ask/tell a person they 
see passing on the street to step over to the police cruiser for a moment 
to answer a few queries: the police might perceive the interaction as 
“asking”, the individual as “telling”. Similarly, the police might indicate 
to a suspect in a criminal investigation that they would like to interview 
him or her. In either case, the individual does not have to comply, but 
likely does not know that. The question of whether he or she was detained 
therefore arises not only for section 9 purposes, but also to determine 
whether the person should have been advised of the right to counsel. 
The need for a much fuller elaboration of the factors establishing 
whether an individual is or is not psychologically detained was apparent 
almost immediately. In 1988, the same year R. v. Thomsen76 was decided, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal set out a list of considerations to be taken into 
account in deciding the issue, in R. v. Moran.77 In the nearly 20 years 
since then, the Supreme Court has not added anything to that discussion. 
The opportunities have existed. In 1993, the Court heard an appeal 
of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Hawkins,78 a case 
where an accused had been questioned at the police station without being 
given the right to counsel. The central issue was whether he was, either 
at the start of the questioning or at some point during it, psychologically 
detained. The Court of Appeal had considered various decisions of other 
courts of appeal, discussed a variety of relevant factors which had been 
listed in them, including the subjective feeling of the individual and the 
need sometimes to protect individuals from themselves, as well as the 
changing views of the police officers doing the questioning. Ultimately 
they proposed the rule that: 
when these suspicions become crystallized, and the investigator’s 
approach to the encounter is changed from a questioning of the individual 
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to an examination with an intent to charge him or her with the offence, 
that a detention must be deemed to have arisen.79 
On the appeal of this case, the Supreme Court’s decision overturning 
the Court of Appeal judgment consisted entirely of this: 
 We are all of the view that on the facts of this case the respondent 
was not detained. It follows that there could not be any infringement 
of his rights guaranteed by section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.80 
A similar opportunity to clarify psychological detention arose in 2006, 
as it happens also on an appeal from a Newfoundland Court of Appeal 
judgment. In R. v. Chaisson,81
 
a police officer saw a car parked behind a 
closed service station and decided to investigate it. Seeing movement in 
the car that appeared to be someone throwing something to the side when 
he approached, the officer told the two occupants to get out. He then 
searched and found a bag of marijuana on the car floor. The trial judge 
found that this amounted to an arbitrary detention, as well as violations 
of sections 8 and 10(b), and excluded the evidence. On these facts, the 
question of psychological detention arises: the accused was not required 
to do as the officer said, but might well have thought he was. The officer’s 
testimony was that he requested the two to get out of the car, but did not 
order them to do so. Further, the accused did not testify as to his perception 
of the situation, so there was no evidence of his subjective perception. 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that it was reasonable to conclude 
that the accused felt psychologically detained. On the other hand, it also 
concluded that the detention was not arbitrary since the officer was 
empowered to act by the decision in R. v. Mann,82
 
and therefore that there 
was no section 9 violation. 
Again the Supreme Court overturned the decision, and again without 
offering any elaboration on the question of psychological detention. On 
this aspect of the decision, it simply held: 
 We are all of the view that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding 
as it did. With respect, we are satisfied that the trial judge was entitled, 
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on the facts as he found them, to conclude that the appellant’s rights 
under ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter had been violated.83 
As a result, the leading case on psychological detention seems still 
to be the 1988 Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Moran.84
 
Perhaps the Supreme Court has felt no need to add to the discussion 
because Moran got it right. If that is the case, though, it would be a simple 
enough matter to say so. If not, then a proper section 9 jurisprudence 
requires elaborating what the correct test for psychological detention 
really is. 
III. THE SECOND 25 YEARS — DOES CLAYTON CHANGE THINGS? 
The Court’s most recent decision with regard to section 9 is R. v. 
Clayton,85 handed down in July 2007. One might ask whether Clayton 
has said anything to change the law on equating “unlawful” with “arbitrary” 
and on the definitions of “arbitrary” and “detention”. The answers to those 
specific questions are “possibly”, “no”, and “no”. The more important 
general question is whether Clayton has changed anything with regard 
to the claim that we really have no section 9 jurisprudence. The answer 
there is that post-Clayton we still have no section 9 jurisprudence, but 
that statement is now true in a new and unfortunate fashion. 
R. v. Clayton86
 
concerned two accused stopped at a police roadblock 
set up in response to a report of men with guns in a parking lot, and 
describing particular vehicles. The police stopped all vehicles leaving 
the parking lot whether they matched the vehicle descriptions or not: 
Clayton and Farmer, the occupants of one car, were both found to have 
handguns. A central issue was whether there was a violation of the 
accuseds’ section 9 rights. 
There was no dispute that the two accused were detained, and so the 
decision offers nothing new on that point. There is also no discussion of 
the definition of “arbitrary”, except to the extent that that issue is related 
to the question of equating “unlawful” and “arbitrary”. That particular 
equation, as noted above, is one which the Court has neither rejected nor 
accepted in previous case law. In R. v. Clayton, however, in a throwaway 
line offered as though the point had been long settled, the Court states: 
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 If the police conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer 
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was 
no violation of their Charter rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct 
fell outside the scope of these powers, it represented an infringement 
of the right under the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or subjected 
to an unreasonable search or seizure. (emphasis added).87 
In this passage the Court does not merely repeat the long-established 
point that a lawful detention is not arbitrary. It also adopts the 
complementary point that an unlawful detention is arbitrary. Thus, the 
Court here explicitly articulates both halves of the “unlawful = arbitrary” 
equation. Indeed, it has done this by coupling the analytical framework 
for section 9 to that of section 8. 
That is precisely the approach which I have argued the Court ought 
to have taken before, and so of course it is encouraging to see it adopted. 
The way in which it has been done is very casual, however, and the 
point is not actually essential to the result reached in the case, so it will 
be important to see the point picked up and applied in subsequent cases. 
In fact, the Court has actually done more than just equate “unlawful” 
and “arbitrary”: it also explicitly articulates the principle that for a lawful 
detention the law itself must be reasonable. It held: 
 The statement that a detention which is lawful is not arbitrary should 
not be understood as exempting the authorizing law, whether it is 
common law or statutory, from Charter scrutiny. Previous decisions of 
this Court are clear that where a detention by police is authorized by law, 
the law authorizing detention is also subject to Charter scrutiny ...88 
Once again this adopts the approach to section 9 which I have 
suggested should be adopted. This particular point, however, raises the 
way in which R. v. Clayton in fact undermines the notion of a section 9 
jurisprudence. While saying the right thing on this point, the majority does 
the wrong thing, and adopts an approach which turns Charter analysis 
on its head. 
The objection I wish to make to the majority’s approach in R. v. 
Clayton89 is very similar to that made by the minority decision in the 
case: in essence, that the analysis of the Charter issue is not a Charter 
analysis at all. The effect is therefore to leave us still without a section 9 
jurisprudence, because the issues have been taken out of the Charter 
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realm. I will briefly review the minority and majority’s approaches to the 
case, but then turn to relate the majority’s approach more specifically to 
past section 9 cases, to show how dramatically matters have changed. 
As noted, R. v. Clayton90 concerned whether in stopping the accused 
at the roadblock despite the fact that their vehicle did not match any 
description given, the police violated section 9. The minority judges held 
that the proper method of analysis was first to ask whether the police 
acted lawfully in stopping the accused: in particular, whether there was 
a common law power permitting them to do so. The second question 
was whether that common law power resulted in an arbitrary detention. 
If so, the next step was to ask whether that law was justified under 
section 1. The minority judges also noted that in some cases it would be 
necessary to ask whether the power was exercised reasonably in the totality 
of the circumstances. All of this is entirely in accord with the traditional 
approach to Charter analysis, in some cases (for example the fourth step) 
bringing the approach to section 9 more in line with that taken to other 
sections. 
Applying that approach to the case, the dissent concluded that no 
previously existing common law power (such as those in R. v. Dedman91 
or R. v. Mann92) authorized the stop but that (using the Waterfield test93) 
a new common law power to set up a roadblock of all vehicles in response 
to a report of ongoing serious firearm offences should be created. As a 
result the detention was authorized by law. That law would nonetheless 
create an arbitrary detention, since it would permit stops in the absence 
of individualized suspicion. However, that section 9 violation could be 
saved under section 1, and so the law did not ultimately violate the 
Charter. Since the manner in which the legal power was used in the case 
was reasonable, there was no Charter violation. 
The majority, really, do none of these things. As noted, they state 
the rule that laws authorizing detentions are subject to Charter scrutiny. 
However, on the basis that the common law should be developed in a 
manner consistent with the Charter, they immediately replace the question 
of whether the accuseds’ section 9 rights were violated with the question of 
whether the Waterfield test authorized the actions of the police. That is, 
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the analysis ceases to be one about individual rights and becomes one 
about police powers. 
Thus, the majority approach does explicitly recognize a point which 
has been implicit in much previous section 9 case law: that the law must 
be reasonable. Having recognized the point, though, the majority turns 
the reasonableness of the law purely into a question about the ancillary 
powers doctrine. This is the contrary of a section 9 Charter jurisprudence. 
The point of section 9 is to protect individuals from unreasonable 
interference by the state, and particularly to protect against the expansion 
of state power. In contrast, the point of the Waterfield94 test is exactly to 
expand state power. Thus the majority’s approach has the opposite goal 
to that which a section 9 analysis should have. Where the question should 
be “what protection do individuals need from state power?” the majority 
instead asks “what powers does the state need?” One can hardly call this 
approach a section 9 jurisprudence. 
Indeed, the decision has the effect of expanding police powers 
dramatically. The Waterfield95
 
test depends on two criteria: that the police 
were acting in the general course of their duties, and that the actions they 
took were not an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty. 
The first criterion is rarely in issue, and so it is the second which really 
settles the issue. In R. v. Clayton the majority effectively reduce that 
question to whether in the totality of the circumstances “the detention of 
a particular individual is ‘reasonably necessary’”.96 But to say that the 
police can detain an individual whenever that is reasonably necessary is 
to make that ability far more frequently available to police. 
One might suggest that the majority’s approach is still doing the same 
thing as section 9 intends: both approaches are meant to find the proper 
balance between individual rights and the needs of the state. However, 
there is a very real difference depending on what one regards as the norm 
and what is carved out from the norm. Recall that R. v. Mann restated 
the fundamental principle that “the police ... may act only to the extent 
that they are empowered to do so by law.”97 That amounts to saying that 
the norm is for the police to be unable to interfere with individual liberty, 
no matter how reasonable it might be to do so, unless they have been 
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given a specific power. The approach in R. v. Clayton,98 on the other hand, 
amounts to saying that the police have the power to do anything which 
is reasonable. In that event, the norm is that police are empowered to act, 
with an exception for cases where that can be shown to be unreasonable. 
That approach might pay lip service to the fundamental principle of 
limited police power, but contradicts its spirit. 
There is another way to look at this point, which ties it more closely 
to previous section 9 case law. In R. v. Dedman,99 the Court below had 
drawn a distinction between police powers and legal liberties. In signalling 
the accused to pull over for a vehicle stop the officer was not, the Court 
of Appeal had held, exercising a power. However, there was no criminal 
or tort law preventing the officer from signalling the accused to stop, 
and so he had the legal liberty to do so. In the circumstances that had 
been held sufficient. The Supreme Court rejected this view. They held 
that reliance on a legal liberty was not an appropriate approach. Rather, 
“[p]olice officers ... only act lawfully if they act in the exercise of authority 
which is either conferred by statute or derived as a matter of common 
law from their duties.”100 
On the one hand, the majority’s approach is consistent with the letter 
of this principle, since on the approach in R. v. Clayton101 the police 
become authorized at common law to detain. However, the approach is 
inconsistent with the spirit of R. v. Dedman.102
 
To say that police are 
authorized at common law to detain when that is reasonably necessary is 
virtually to say that they can detain so long as no law prevents them from 
doing so: most exercises of legal liberties will be reasonable. In its effect 
Clayton therefore comes very close to saying that as long as police act 
in accordance with their legal liberties then they are empowered to act: 
that is inconsistent with Dedman. Essentially every reasonable detention 
is a police power on the Clayton approach. 
Further, adopting this point goes some considerable distance toward 
undermining having equated “unlawful” with “arbitrary” earlier in the 
decision. A major benefit of making that equation is to simplify the task 
of deciding whether or not a detention is arbitrary, since it should be 
relatively simple to determine whether it was made unlawfully. But on 
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the R. v. Clayton103
 
approach it will become more difficult to determine 
whether a detention was unlawful. The absence of a statutory power will 
certainly not settle the point, because if the detention is found to be 
reasonable then it will likely turn out to have been lawful after all. However 
it will not always be obvious beforehand — and certainly not at the time 
of the interaction between the police and the individual — whether the 
detention will later be seen as reasonable. In that event, the scope of 
section 9 is actually made less clear, not more clear, by the decision. 
Similarly, it was argued above that a benefit of equating “unlawful” 
and “arbitrary” was that it better reflected the fundamental principle, 
found in R. v. Mann104 and elsewhere, that individuals are free to do 
anything not forbidden while police are only permitted to do those things 
they are specifically empowered to do. That is, there will be some situations 
where an individual clearly has a Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained, 
and other situations where police clearly have the power to detain an 
individual. Falling in between those clear situations will be a large grey 
area, where an individual’s behaviour will simply fall into the “not 
forbidden” category, rather than being the exercise of a guaranteed right. 
In those cases it will be less clear whether police action which is not 
specifically authorized by law will constitute an arbitrary detention. To 
say that unlawful — i.e., not in accordance with a specific power granted 
to the police — actions are arbitrary is to start the analysis on the 
assumption that there is a prima facie section 9 violation. This would 
then allow the grey area to be dealt with by balancing the various relevant 
factors, which will be relevant to later parts of the Charter analysis such 
as in section 1 or section 24. 
On the other hand, the approach in R. v. Clayton105
 
of asking what 
powers police need rather than what freedoms individuals need leads to 
the opposite result. On the reasoning in Clayton, actions will be lawful if 
they are permitted at common law, and the common law powers of the 
police will include actions which are reasonably necessary. In effect this 
eliminates most of the grey area, assimilating it into the police powers 
category. Accordingly, there would be no prima facie Charter violation 
and therefore no opportunity to balance the relevant factors at later stages 
of the analysis. 
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To conclude on R. v. Clayton,106 two things are worth noting. The first 
is a certain irony. Neither R. v. Dedman107
 
nor R. v. Mann108 were hailed 
as strong “civil liberty” cases when they were handed down: rather, both 
were expansions of police powers. That one can criticize Clayton for 
failing to live up to the standards of restraint on state power articulated 
in those decisions, therefore, is a truly worrying prospect. 
The other concluding point relates to a matter which is taken for 
granted by the majority and explicitly stated by the minority, but which, 
it must be said, is not correct. The whole discussion around the legality 
of the police action focuses on whether there is a common law power in 
this case, because the “absence of Parliamentary action”109 makes that 
approach necessary. In fact, though, Parliament has legislated in ways 
directly relevant to this situation. 
A police roadblock is an investigative procedure which constitutes a 
search, and an unreasonable one if not authorized. No provision in the 
Criminal Code110 specifically authorizes roadblocks — which means 
that the police here could have obtained a general warrant under section 
487.01 authorizing them to act as they did. Further, under section 487.01(7) 
they could have obtained that general warrant by telephone, using the 
telewarrant provisions. Parliament in fact has acted in a way to cover 
precisely this situation, and indeed virtually all situations, since section 
487.01 allows a warrant to “do any thing”. 
The police might claim that there was not time in this situation even 
to obtain a telewarrant, since immediate action was necessary. In that 
regard it is worth noting Parliament’s action in creating section 487.11 
of the Criminal Code,111 allowing some powers to be exercised in exigent 
circumstances where grounds for a warrant exist but it is impracticable 
to obtain one. Note, though, that although Parliament made that provision 
available for search warrants in section 487, it did not make them available 
for general warrants in section 487.01. On the other hand, this “exigent 
circumstances” exception, which was added to the Code after the general 
warrant provisions, does apply to section 492.1 tracking warrants, which 
were added to the Code at the same time as general warrants. It seems 
hard to escape the conclusion that Parliament deliberately did not make 
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the powers available under general warrants available without judicial 
scrutiny in exigent circumstances. That deliberate decision is not an 
“absence of Parliamentary action”: it is a conscious policy choice. Further, 
it is a conscious policy choice ignored and contradicted by creating a 
common law power to exactly the opposite effect. 
Of course, one might analyze sections 487.01, 487.1, 487.11 and 
others and reach a different conclusion than that offered here. But surely 
if a new common law power is to be created on the basis of Parliamentary 
inaction, a full justification must look at the variety of relevant ways 
Parliament has in fact acted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The right not to be arbitrarily detained has been the neglected aspect 
of the legal rights set out in the Charter. There is no reason in principle 
that this should be so: the nature of many coercive state powers is precisely 
to detain, and therefore knowing the limits on such powers would be a 
valuable thing. Nonetheless, the first 25 years of Charter case law failed 
to establish a useful method of analysis for assessing section 9 claims. 
Such a long period of neglect seems undesirable, and of course it is 
so. The most recent developments, however, suggest that benign neglect 
can be preferable to harmful attention. To neglect section 9 was simply 
not to develop the limits on state power that could have been developed. 
To continue in the approach to section 9 that R. v. Clayton112 adopts, 
however, would actually be to expand state power. 
It is worth recalling the words of Dickson J. (as he then was) speaking 
for a unanimous Supreme Court in the early days of Charter jurisprudence: 
I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
is a purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, 
within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it 
enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent 
with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for 
governmental action.113 
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Failing to have a well-articulated approach to deciding whether or 
not the detention of an individual was arbitrary is unfortunate. On balance, 
however, that was preferable to an approach that turns the Charter on its 
head and makes it a tool for the limitation, not the protection, of individual 
rights. 
  
